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It is one of the most popular leitmotifs in comparative legal science that civil and common legal 
systems are converging.2 The primary consideration behind this is that the role of “precedents” are 
increasing in civil legal systems, while statutory law’s importance is growing in common law 
jurisdictions. As McCormick states in the Introduction to a comparative study of precedent:  
 
To differentiate ‘civilian’ to ‘common law’ systems is a commonplace among lawyers. It is trite learning that 
precedents count for less in civilian legal systems than in those of the common law, and it has sometimes been 
doubted whether they stand for anything much at all in civilian systems. The present work shows the doubt to be 
groundless. Here it is shown that precedent counts for a great deal in civilian systems. The tendency to 
convergence between systems of the two types is a salient fact of the later twentieth century, although there 
remain real differences, some of great importance.3 
 
In 2012 we performed a study with a help of a database consisting of more than 60,000 Hungarian 
judicial decisions, published on the website of the State Office of Courts (Országos Bírósági Hivatal),4 
in order to explore an important aspect of the “precedential character” of Hungarian law. The first 
(quantitative) part of the research was computer-based: we collected and analysed all the citations 
to precedents within the text of the decisions and analysed the citation patterns. In the second 
(qualitative) phase, we selected 520 decisions randomly, read them, and recorded five additional 
aspects in a database.5  
The inspiration to prepare statistics on citations, represented by links in the database, came from 
Citators. At the end of the 19th century the number of published cases in America increased 
dramatically.6 There was no selection, almost every decision was published. This caused turbulence 
in several fields7, but one of the most dramatic instances was that separating the “good” law from 
“bad” became harder and harder.  
                                                          
1 The author thanks the following persons [this is fine as is, but “people” would be more common here]: Tamás 
GRÓSZ for the preparation of the computer-based statistics; Miklós SZABÓ for supporting the research in 
University of Miskolc; Zsolt CZÉKMANN, for coordinating the research in the qualitative part. When I say ‘we’ in 
this article, I am referring to this small team. I am also grateful to Péter DARÁK, for supporting the project and 
hosting the discussion of the first version of this paper at Curia in 27 November 2013. I am also grateful for all 
of my colleagues who took part in this discussion and made valuable contributions to the text.  
2 DAVID, René and BRIERLEY, John, E.C: Major Legal Systems in the World Today, An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law, Steven and Sons, London, 133; MERRYMAN, John Henry: On the Convergence (and 
Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 357-388 17 Stan. J. Int'l L. 357 (1981) 358, and footnote 3.,  
3 MACCORMICK, D. Neil – SUMMERS, Robert S: Interpreting Precedents, A Comparative Study, Ashgate, Dartmouth, 
1997. 2 
4 http://www.birosag.hu/ugyfelkapcsolati-portal/anonim-hatarozatok-tara  
5 See the list below at III.1.  
6 Mr. John West, the founder of the West Publishing Company himself regards this incidence a turning point in 
the history of law reports. WEST, John B.: The Multiplicity of Reports, 2 Law Libr. J. 1 (1909-1910) 45 
7 Here I just mention the problem of indices, the uniform numbering of cases, and the efforts of establishing a 
centralised law reporter instead of the „multiplicity of reports.” WEST (1909), 5 
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This was the reason for the emergence of Citators. These are tables that show the citations, and also 
the context of a citation. The best known amongst these citators was that published by Frank 
Shepard in 1875. The so-called Shepard’s Citations is based on a very simple idea: if a certain decision 
is mentioned in a later one, it is recorded together with the context in the citator. The more a case is 
cited in a positive context the more it is important.  
It is more than an interesting coincidence that Shephard’s method inspired Eugene Garfield8 to 
create the Science Citation Index, which later became the most widely used method of measuring 
the impact or importance of a scientific work.9 Even nowadays the primary tool for measuring the 
importance of an article, a publication forum (journal), or a scientist is still based on this method. The 
frequency and the context of citations, as well as the importance of the citing authorities, also 
became a very important (if not the most important) part of the Google-algorithm, PageRank10. 
Search engines before Google were all based on two methods: the free-text search and  meta-tags 
put on webpages. But it turned out very quickly that the data published on the internet exceeds the 
amount that can be handled through these two processes, and the only usable method is, if 
relevance ranking is to be based on measurable traces of cognitive authority, generated by human 
knowledge – in other words, hyperlinks and citations.11  
 
This paper shows the results of both of the quantitative and the qualitative analyses and is divided 
into three main chapters.  
The first chapter will describe the theoretical and methodological background of the research, 
including the theoretical framework we worked with, the differences between common law and civil 
law systems, and the importance of citations. For a better understanding, I sketch the institutional 
background, structure, and types of the courts and “precedents” in Hungarian law, as well as the 
characteristics of the raw material we worked with. I will also describe the methodological and 
technical considerations behind the computer-based analysis.  
The second chapter shows the results of the computer-based citation analysis we prepared from 
them. In the text that follows the tables, I attempt to give explanations and conclusions I have drawn 
from them, and later from all. The analysis is comprised of the number of citations used/made by 
different courts, court levels and court branches, case types, and legal fields. We observed the 
dynamics of citations over the years, showing the change in time. We compared a number of factors, 
such as the use of different ’precedent types’.  
The third chapter contains the results of the qualitative research and some final conclusions. It tries 
to tackle questions for which machine-made statistics cannot answer – questions which can only be 
properly analysed contextually.  These are, for example: the role and status of precedent in legal 
reasoning, the link between use of precedent and the value of the case, and the existence of 
“distinguishing” – explicitly using the rule within a previous case in a different way in a recent case, 
when the facts of the cases are different. 
 
                                                          
8 Eugene GARFIELD himself was telling the story of Science Citation Index in a video interview: “People don’t 
even simply know this: there was no citation index at that time for larger rules. It came later. That came out, 
that Shepard produced that citation index long before we started SCI, because librarians started to complain, 
that why don’t they have a citation index for journals. (…) And I went down to the reference room, and that’s 
when I saw what Shepard Citation was, and I literally screamed, (…) When I saw Shepard, I realized, that the 
index had to be inverted, because they had the document as the focus, and the statements to be followed.” 
http://www.webofstories.com/play/eugene.garfield/25;jsessionid=1C696C9302267E140AE26CB1273D2833  
9 And it cannot be a simple coincidence, that later Google, which revolutionized the Internet search, is also 
based on citation, hyperlinks  and it is also measuring the importance of the place of publication either with 
different tools.  
10 http://searchengineland.com/what-is-google-pagerank-a-guide-for-searchers-webmasters-11068#definition 
11 ZŐDI, Zsolt: A Google, a jogi adatbázisok és a szöveg számítógépes uralásának három módja (Google, legal 
databases and the three ways of text control by computers) Infokommunikáció és jog, 46/2011., 175-178 (in 
Hungarian)  
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I. Theoretical background of the research 
 
1. The theory of precedent in common law 
 
In common law systems, judicial decisions form the primary sources of law. The idea of judicial 
precedent12, as a central element in legal reasoning, rests upon four interconnected pillars:  
 The principle/doctrine of stare decisis; 
 The distinction between ratio decidendi, and obiter dicta;  
 The method (‘the art’) of distinguishing; and finally  
 A general idea that the “rule” is not the one that is explicitly written in the decision, but what 
makes law is the “spirit”. Precedents are not “saying”: but “doing” something13.  
 
The first constituent part of the theory of precedent is the concept of stare decisis - the principle that 
courts must follow the decisions of the upper courts, as these are binding. Though the modern 
doctrine of stare decisis was not explicitly formulated before the middle of the 19th century14, stare 
decisis is the main/primary distinguishing feature of the common law systems. With a few 
exceptions, cases, even the most important decisions of the Supreme Court, are never formally 
binding in a continental system – or at least this is what theory says.  
 
The second pillar on which the theory of precedent rests, and which interacts very closely with the 
previous, is the differentiation of ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. This distinction says that only the 
ratio is binding, whereas dicta is not. To this end, ratio decidendi should be separated from the 
incidental explications, “tangential observations”15 and arguments employed within the reasoning. 
As John Austin stated:  
 
Since no two cases are precisely alike, the decision of a specific case may partly turn upon reasons which are 
suggested to the judge by its specific peculiarities or differences. And that part of the decision which turns on 
those differences (or that part of the decision which consists of those special reasons), cannot serve as a 
precedent for subsequent decisions, and cannot serve as a rule or guide of conduct. The general reasons or 
principles of a judicial decision (as thus abstracted from any peculiarities of the case) are commonly styled, by -
writers on jurisprudence, the [r]atio decidendi.16 
 
What is particularly interesting in this quotation is that Austin is not speaking about different parts of 
the texts: what he is talking about is rather a distinction between a relationship of facts and rules of 
the case. Cases are alike, and if we create a rule, we have to ignore certain circumstances, in order to 
set up a legally proper rule. Later (especially in America, as we will see), ratio decidendi and  obiter 
dicta were theorized as different parts within the reasoning, separate textual elements. The former 
were considered as important and as something that should be followed; the latter was understood 
                                                          
12 The concepts of precedent, ratio decidendi, and stare decisis have an enormous literature. I cite here only 
those which I used to formulate my ideas: HART, H.L.A: The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961. 134; 
SCHAUER, Frederick: Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571 (1986-1987), 573-574., and especially footnote 5.; KEMPIN, 
Frederick: Precedent and Stare Decisis, the Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 Am. J. Legal Hist. 28 (1959) 30; 
DUXBURY, Neil: The Nature and Authority of Precedent, Cambridge University Press, 2008; STONE, Julius: The 
Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 3 Am. J. Legal Hist. 28 (1959) 597; GOODHARD, Arthur L.: Determining the Ratio 
Decidendi of a Case 40 Yale L. J. 161 (1930-1931); 10.; SILTALA, Raimo: A Theory of Precedent, From Analytical 
Positivism to a Post-Analitical Philosophy of Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford- Portland, Oregon, 2000 
13 HART (see supra note 12.) 134. – the “hat” example 
14 KEMPIN (see supra note 12) 31-32;   
15 DUXBURY (see supra note 12) 26 
16 GOODHARD (see supra note 12) cites AUSTIN, John: Lectures on Jurisprudence, etc. (1885), 627, in note 2. 161 
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to be less important and not a part of the rule itself that is supported or created by the case. 
Moreover, Julius Stone states: “[T]his can mean is that the scope of the ratio decidendi of the 
precedent case will frequently not be determined or determinable until further decisions have been 
made;” 17  
 
The third pillar is that for the proper and wise handling of the precedent, in order to “create” a right 
ratio out of the spirit (and not the specific wording of the text) of the decision, the judge has to 
exercise the art of distinguishing. This is a process, whereby the actors in the judicial process are 
recognizing what are the similarities and differences between two or more cases, and argue, that the 
differences have an effect on the legal consequences. The method is closely connected to the 
method of analogy. In fact, Siltala states, that “the use of analogy, and distinguishing are the two 
sides of the same coin”18. When using the analogy, we disregard any dissimilarities between the two 
cases, while using the distinction we attach relevance to similarities.  
And finally, the fourth pillar is the most general consideration and also a consequence of the 
previous three: precedents are “doing” something rather than simply “saying’ something. As Tiersma 
states:  
 
As a consequence, the common law remained conceptually distinct from statutory law. What mattered was the 
court's decision and the general principle that underlay it, and not the precise words in which the decision was 
expressed. As Mansfield said: "The law does not consist of particular cases, but of general principles, which are 
illustrated and explained by these cases." Mansfield also noted that "[t]he reason and spirit of cases make law; 
not the letter of particular precedents” 19 
 
To put this in another way, Holdsworth, when writing about the evolution of case law and citing 
Coke, Hale and Blackstone finally concludes that “cases do not make law, but are only the best 
evidence of what the law is.”20 Duxbury in his book also argues that “Sometimes, furthermore, the 
authority of precedent will rest not in a specific decision, but in a series of decisions, which sediment 
to form something which lawyers and judges will commonly refer to as a ‘rule’, even though this rule 
might not have been expressly formulated in the case law”.21  
 
Although Tiersma argues that there is a huge difference between the law of Britain and the U.S., and 
one of the main point of difference is that in the U.S. there is an ongoing process of “textualization” 
of the precedent, there is still an important presumption in common law systems that it is the “spirit” 
of the decision that really counts. Judges have to follow the ratio, the principles22 behind the 
decision, and not just the wording that these decisions are using.  
 
2. The theory of judicial practice, and the role of courts in civil law systems 
 
My preliminary hypothesis is that if these four pillars are not present in the judicial process, we 
cannot talk about case law and theory of precedent. Let us examine them one by one in the context 
of a civil law system.  
 
                                                          
17 STONE (see supra note 12) 607 
18 Siltala (see supra note 12) 94  
19 This is the argument of Hart, (see supra note 5), but plays a central role in Tiersma’s argumentation as well. 
See, TIERSMA, Peter, M: The Textualization of Precedent, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1187 (2006-2007), 1202  
20 HOLDSWORTH, W. S: Case Law, 50 L. Q. Rev. 180 (1934), 184 
21 DUXBURY, (see supra note 12) 23 
22 HOLDSWORTH, (see supra note 12) quotes Frederick POLLOCK: “Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words 
used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles recognised and 
applied as necessary grounds of the decision.” 
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The lack of stare decisis is clear. In civil law systems, it is not obligatory to follow previous cases. This 
does not mean that courts do not follow de facto previous cases. But, even when they do, courts 
handle precedents differently within the reasoning. On the other hand, if they do not follow 
precedent, normally the upper courts have no right to take action against this. Even if in some legal 
systems, like that in Hungary, there are certain types of documents issued by the Supreme Court 
which are obligatory, these instruments deal with isolated problems, and are formulated as a 
statutory amendment.  
 
The ratio-obiter distinction is also missing. The ideology behind a statutory law system is 
incompatible with any idea that there are important, and less important parts within any particular 
legal text. This applies for judicial decisions too. As we will see later, in Hungarian judicial practice the 
ratio of the judicial decision is formulated in a form of a “headnote”, and this headnote functions as a 
legal amendment, as a kind of “executive”, or “interpretative” supplement to the law. Even if courts 
are citing a case, in most of the cases they cite only the headnote, like amendments of an Act.  
In close connection with the abovementioned two features, the practice of distinguishing cases does 
not exist. It is substituted with interpretation. If a factual situation does not entirely fit to the original 
model of the general norm, judges have to reinterpret the text of the norm. It is not only about 
“penumbra” and “core” meaning23, but has something to do with the theory of coherence. 
Interpretation should be performed in the light of other amendments, because legal amendments 
form a system.24 Interpretation should be done in a systematic way; one amendment standing alone 
has practically no meaning. 25 
Finally, it is clear that civil law systems are textual. Interpretation should ultimately follow the 
wording, the text of the law. In this way, what counts is what the law “says”, and not what it “does”.  
If we take a short look at the history of civil law, it is clear that the genesis of these systems is also 
hopelessly bound to texts – to Digesta, than to Corpus Iuris,26 and to the great Civil Codes of France, 
Prussia, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.  
Therefore, the primary tool of handling of similar cases, and the adaptation of the law to the 
changing socio-cultural and economic circumstances is the interpretation of texts. The work of the 
judge is, at least on an ideological level, mainly manipulations of texts. This has two additional 
consequences.  
It seems that reasoning is different in civil law systems. These systems are based on norms, which are 
abstract and general in wording, and judicial decisions tend to show themselves rather as logical 
operations, than rhetorical efforts. Here the result (the judgment) is directly coming from the 
premises, and is not aiming toward persuasion. According to a recent theory27 the judicial decision 
can be viewed as an ongoing process of “linguistic conversions”, and there are differences in the 
ways these texts are “translated” to one another. 28 The tightest connection is “inference”, when the 
two texts are in a logical connection. The second is “justification”, which only demonstrates that the 
two texts can be inosculated (without logical controversy). The third type is “reasoning”, which 
connects the two texts in a rhetorical rather than logical way, with the ultimate goal of persuasion. 
During the research, I identified a fourth type of connection (which can be categorized as an extreme 
version of the first one): the “demonstration”. This type involves referencing official texts without 
even citing them, for example, when courts only mention a “long standing judicial practice” without 
any further explanation. The “demonstration” is surprisingly frequent in Hungarian judicial decisions.  
                                                          
23 HART (see supra note 12) 134 
24 SAVIGNY, Friedrich Carl von: System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Berlin, 1840, 262 
25 SOMLÓ, Felix: Juristische Grundlehre, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1917, 97 
26 BERMAN, Harold J: Law and Revolution, The Formation of the Weestern Legal Tradition, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Mass., etc. 1983, 127-131 
27 SZABÓ, Miklós: Law as Translation. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. (ARSP Beiheft Nr. 91) 2004, 60-68 
28 SZABÓ, Miklós: ’A jogászi érvelés változása’, (Change in Legal Reasoning [after 1990]): Szabadfalvi (ed.): 
Facultas nata, Miskolc, Bíbor, 400-401 
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From a broader perspective, this phenomenon also has a close relation to certain sociological and 
institutional factors. These are the hierarchical structure of the courts, the authority and style of 
judicial decisions, and the structure of the profession of judges. The hierarchy of courts has 
significance, because the Supreme Court, while “ensuringing the unity” of the judicial decisions is 
issuing two different types of documents. First it issues the summaries of cassation cases in case 
journals, and second, “guidance”, in the form of “unification decisions” or other “Abstract 
Opinions”.29 The style and the authority of judicial decisions also have a significance. Since the 
decisions tend to show themselves as the result of a logical process, they are normally shorter and 
less explanatory than in common law systems. They rarely speak to the layman, and their overall 
respect they are granted is a lot lower than in common law. Finally, there is the authority of the 
judiciary. This is in close connection with the “career type”, life-long appointed, bureaucratic 
character of the profession.30  
The attitude towards judicial decisions as sources of law can be classified into two groups in 
Hungarian judicial practice. In the first, judge made law is not allowed (and is not recognized as 
existing), as only the lawmaker or legislature can create new law. This was the official point of view of 
early communist jurisprudence.31 Later, the ideology became slightly more permissive, and another 
concept was articulated, which could be called a “restricted role of judge-made law”. According to 
this idea, judge-made law is a “unfortunate necessity” and only a temporary phenomenon. Since the 
text of the laws can be adjusted to meet the changing socio-economical needs slowly, the first steps 
might be taken by the courts. But the legislation must incorporate the legal solutions elaborated by 
the courts to the text of the statutes as soon as possible.32 Since new problems and needs are 
continuously emerging, this whole process is cyclical.  
 
3. Signs of convergence 
 
From the end of the 19th century, supreme courts all around Europe were granted the right to ensure 
legal unity.33 This concept of legal unity is the civilian counterpart of stare decisis, since, through the 
unification process, the supreme courts can overrule the diverging practice of a particular court.  
After the Second World War, constitutional courts were established in civil law countries, which 
followed a case law method34, further strengthening the culture of precedents within the civilian 
systems. A third factor was that from the end of the 1950s, an extensive publication of judicial 
decisions was started in Europe, both by commercial publishers and by the courts themselves.35 And 
                                                          
29 The “abstract resolution” also exists in Poland. See MORAWSKI, Lech– ZIRK-SADOWSKY, Marek: ‘Precedent in 
Poland’, in: MACCORMICK - SUMMERS (see supra note 12) 220. The Hungarian situation’s peculiarity is that 
abstract opinions issued by the chambers (civil, penal, etc.) of the Supreme Court played a very important role 
in the past, and these are still cited very frequently.  
30 David, (see supra note 3), 140 
31 See e.g. SZAMEL, Lajos: A jogforrások, (Sources of Law) Budapest, KJK, 1958. 130-132. (in Hungarian)  
32 See e.g. OROSZ, Árpád: Az egyedi ügyekhez igazodás magyar gyakorlata a polgári ügyszakban, (The Practice of 
Following Individual Cases in Hungary in Civil Law Branch) Jogesetek Magyarázata 2012/3 79 – 82 (in 
Hungarian) 
33 E.g. Art 95 (3) of the German Grundgesetz says: (3) Zur Wahrung der Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung ist 
ein Gemeinsamer Senat der in Absatz 1 genannten Gerichte zu bilden. Das Nähere regelt ein Bundesgesetz. The 
Act mentioned is the Gesetz zur Wahrung der Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung der obersten Gerichtshöfe des 
Bundes. The Hungarian solution is very similar to this.  
34 On the history of German Constitutional Court see: KOMMERS, Donald P.; MILLER, Russell A.: Das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the German Federal Constitutional Court 3 Journal 
of Comparative Law (2008), 194-211. On the case-law of the Court see: ALEXY, Robert – DREIER, Ralph: 
‘Precedent in the Federal Republic of Germany’. in: MACCORMICK –SUMMERS (see supra note 12) 17. 
35 KAVASS, Igor I.: Law Reporting: Comparisons between Western Europe and Common Law Countries, 5 
International Journal of Law Libraries (1977), 104-120 o. „An increasing number of experts on this subject (…) 
have observed for some time a gradual drift towards a more extensive publication and use of judicial decisions 
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finally, the Internet initiated dramatic changes, when – partly as a consequence of Freedom of 
Information legislation –  a huge number of (unedited) judicial decisions were published online, and 
effective search engines further increased the visibility of these decisions.  
All these developments were pointing in one direction: the number of citations in judicial decisions 
started to increase in civilian systems. I think this has driven Komárek36 to develop a theory, which 
argues that civil law systems have their own method of handling cases, namely “reasoning with 
previous cases”, which is the equivalent of the “case-law method”. I argue in Part III of this article 
that there is no such method, at least not in Hungarian law. Rather, the use of previous cases is 
basically similar to the use of statutory amendments.  
 
 
4. Background, methodology and scope of the research 
 
4.1. The structure of the Hungarian court system 
 
The Hungarian Court system has four levels. The 111 local courts are the courts of first instance. The 
second level courts are the County Courts, of which there are 20 (one in each of the 19 counties and 
the Capital Court). There are also four Appellate Courts. At the top of the judicial system is the 
Supreme Court (Curia).  
Local courts (111 - járásbíróságok, formerly helyi bíróságok) are the courts of first instance. 
Consequently, they are competent in minor issues. There are separate labour and administrative 
courts as courts of first instance but there are only 20 of them. They are all located in the county 
courts’ city.  
County courts (20 - törvényszékek, formerly megyei bíróságok) decide civil and penal cases having 
“important” or high value subject matter at the first instance and appellate suits in cases started at 
the local level. They are the second instance courts for administrative and labour issues.  
The appellate courts’ (4 - táblabíróságok) main function is to serve as a second instance court on 
cases which were decided at the county level. (Normally local courts are the courts of first instance, 
so cases started at county level are special because of their subject matter - e.g. copyright - or 
because of the value of the lawsuit.  
All County and Appellate Courts are organized into three departments and further into branches. The 
main departments are the civil department (subdivided into the normal civil branch, which deals with 
cases between private parties, and the business branch, which deals with cases between business 
organisations); the penal department; and – at County Court -- the administrative and labour 
department (subdivided into an administrative branch, dealing with the supervision of the decisions 
of the administrative organs, and a labour branch).  
The Supreme Court has a double function: it serves as a Court of Cassation in decided cases (as a 
court of third instance), and has a legal unification role – i.e. its task is to monitor the jurisdiction of 
lower courts, and in case of divergence issue certain acts.  
 
 
 
4.2. Types of decisions - unedited decisions (citing documents) and edited 
precedents (cited documents)  
 
                                                          
in Western European countries. (…) They do (…) perform several important socio political functions which are 
not different form similar developments in the use of judicial decisions in other economically advanced 
countries, irrespective of whether their legal systems are based on Common Law or not.” (105) 
36 KOMÁREK, Jan: Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent. 61 Am. J. Comp. L. , (2013), 
149-171, 156-157 
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4.2.1. Unedited decisions – the analysed citing documents 
 
For the research, we split the data into two parts: to citing and cited documents (precedents). 
Presently, around 500,000 lawsuits are heard per year in Hungarian courts, and around 11,000 
resulting decisions are published. More than 90% of these latter cases are published under the FOI 
act37, in their unedited, original form; only the data of the parties are deleted for privacy reasons 
from the decision. This database was the one for the research of the citing documents. This database 
represents the day-to-day practice of the courts in a raw, unedited form. From the beginning of the 
publication of the decisions in 2007 to the time this research closed in 2012, the number of items in 
this database was 61,512.  
 
  Civil Business Labour Administrative Penal Total  
Supreme Court 4,873 867 1,465 5,496 1,166 13,867 
Appellate Courts 9,907 3,548 0 1,172 2,704 17,331 
County Courts 10,705 4,297 1,588 7,934 3,066 27,590 
Local Courts 1,396 314 0 0 1,014 2,724 
Total  26,881 9,026 3,053 14,602 7,950 61,512 
 
Table 1 – Unedited judgments (UEJ) in the CJD – Citing documents database 
 
 
4.2.2. Edited decisions – cited documents 
 
In the abovementioned group, we analysed the citations of “precedents” that are mainly published in 
official and private case journals.  We went back as early as possible. The different journals were 
started at different times. The structure of the cases and the starting date of publication can be 
found in Table 2 below.  
 
 Type of edited case Issuer of decisions Publisher 
Start date of 
collection 
Number of 
decisions in 
total 
Uniformity Decisions (UD)  Supreme Court Official 1999 (1977) 169 
Abstract Opinions (AO)  Supreme Court Official 1975 1,162 
Principal Decisions of the Curia (PD)  Supreme Court Official 1999 2,441 
Court Decisions of the Curia (CD)  Supreme Court Official 1975 20,118 
Decisions from Collection of Court 
Decisions Journal (CCD)  Appellate Courts Private 2002 2,722 
Decisions from Administrative and 
Business Cases Collection (ABC)  Supreme Court Private 1992 5,636 
Constitutional Court Decisions (CC) Constitutional Court Official 1990 2,870 
Total       35,118 
 
Table 2 – Edited decisions, “precedents” – Cited documents 
 
The main issuer of precedents is the Supreme Court. It regularly publishes four types of documents.  
The first is the Uniformity Decision (UD) (before 1997 these had different names, (Elvi döntés) which 
decides a controversial legal question that had led to conflicting decisions in lower courts. The UD is 
formulated like a decision, and – apart from some rare examples – it only decides the debated legal 
question before the court. This form of decision has a binding power on lower courts.  
                                                          
37 The Act on Electronic Freedom of Information (Act XC. of 2005. § 16.) introduced the Collection of Judicial 
Decisions, and publication was started at 2007. Recently the Act on the Organisation and Administration of 
Courts, (Act CLXI. of 2011. § 163.) is regulating the issue.  
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In the second type there are non-binding explanatory documents, the Abstract Opinions (AO) of the 
professional branches (civil branch with civil and business departments, penal branch, and labour and 
administrative branch with labour and administrative departments) of Curia, which are passed by the 
body of judges working in the same chamber, called College. Therefore they have the slightly 
misleading name of “College Opinions” in Hungarian jargon. AOs have great importance in the 
Hungarian legal system. These quasi-norms are not deciding one particular restricted legal problem, 
but normally they deal with a set of controversial legal questions within a field of law (such as 
problems of cases regarding joint property or the legal aspects of libel cases). Though these acts has 
no legal binding power, courts do follow and use them.  
Finally, third type contains two sub-types of “precedents”. Both are individual cases selected from 
the practice of the Supreme Court as a Court of Cassation. The first type is the normal decision, called 
a court decision – CD), while the other is selected because of its “principal importance” (Principal 
decision - PD). Both of these are individual decisions, and restricted to one particular legal question.  
All of the abovementioned types of documents are published in the official journal of the supreme 
court (Decisions of the Curia – Kúriai Döntések, formerly Bírósági Határozatok, BH).  
Private publishers also publish decisions. There are two influential journals, both published by 
Wolters Kluwer, Hungary: the Collection of Court Decisions (CCD), containing some 400 cases per 
year, and the Administrative and Business Cases Collection (ABC), with around the same amount.   
Besides the abovementioned types, there is one additional of “precedent type” which is frequently 
cited, the decisions of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court was established in 1989, 
and currently publishes about 100 decisions per year. It has its own official journal, but the most 
important decisions are also published in the Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny).  
All of the abovementioned decision-types (except constitutional court decisions) have one thing in 
common: they have an edited headnote, which is typically one or two (in the cases of UD, PD, CD, 
CCD, or ABC) or more (in the case of AO 5-15) amendments. These amendments are formulated like 
rules of an Act.  
 
4.3. The operative methodology of the research 
 
The operative methodology of this research was the following. We used a commercial legal database, 
which contains both the citing and the cited documents. Within the database there are metadata 
attached to the documents, such as the type of document, department and branch, issuing court, 
date of issue, and the subject of the decision. Further, the citations are also stored in a database as 
hyperlinks, where the starting point of the link and the end point of the link are exactly identified. 
We then made queries from different angles, and prepared tables. For example, we looked at how 
many documents contain a citation to a precedent, how these citations are distributed across court 
level, per branch, per subject of case, per time.  
Here I have to mention certain peculiarities of a computer-based analysis of this type. Machines do 
not understand the text or the context. They perform logical and mathematical operations with 
strings, no matter how complex these mathematical operations and the underlying rules are. They 
compare two datasets (like a vocabulary and a text) and count certain data, as a result of a query. 
Therefore, machine-made statistics have certain limitations. The first, and most important, is that the 
computer will not recognize any string that is not written in the defined format. The second is, that it 
does not understand even the basic context of the mentioning. For example It makes a huge 
difference if a decision is mentioned in another decision this way, that “the court followed the XY 
decision”, or like this, “the court ignored the plaintiff’s reference to XY decision, because its facts are 
different from the case under investigation”. Furthermore, computers cannot understand who 
proposed or mentioned the case for the first time. In short, machine made statistics can only a 
quantitative picture about some simple, measurable parameters of judicial practice. For any 
contextual analysis, the decisions must be read and understood by humans. This does not exclude 
the possibility that with the development of IT and Artificial Intelligence, more and more of these 
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problems can be eliminated and that machines will ultimately be capable of answering increasingly 
contextual questions.  
 
II. Computer based analysis of the citations (qualitative 
research)  
 
1. The frequency of citations, court levels, branches, document types 
 
The first simple question observed was that of how many of the citing documents (unedited 
judgments) contain any citations, references to any edited decisions. We created the following tables 
for all court levels. The rows of each table lists the various court branches, while the columns list the 
cited decision types.  It is important to mention that the “sum of documents containing citation” is 
not the sum of the previous columns, because one document can contain a citation to two or more 
different types of precedents.  
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1.1. Supreme Court (Curia)  
  
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 4,873 62 569 291 1,045 78 13 98 1,791 
Business branch 867 41 68 94 144 22 5 8 275 
Labour branch 1,465 19 156 135 569 8 4 56 731 
Administrative 
branch  5,496 109 171 144 610 5 166 197 1,146 
Penal branch 1,166 130 88 44 291 2 2 27 485 
Curia total 13867 361 1,052 708 2,659 115 190 386 4,428 
  
Table 3a – Citations to edited precedents – Curia, figures 
 
 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1% 12% 6% 21% 2% 0% 2% 37% 
Business branch 5% 8% 11% 17% 3% 1% 1% 32% 
Labour branch 1% 11% 9% 39% 1% 0% 4% 50% 
Administrative 
branch  2% 3% 3% 11% 0% 3% 4% 21% 
Penal branch 11% 8% 4% 25% 0% 0% 2% 42% 
Curia total 3% 8% 5% 19% 1% 1% 3% 32% 
 
Table 3b – Citations to edited precedents – Curia, percentages 
 
1.2. Appellate courts 
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 9,907 154 1,869 663 1,962 739 45 829 4,088 
Business branch 3,548 161 386 368 810 462 23 34 1,304 
Labour branch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Administrative 
branch  1,172 48 113 22 41 3 20 44 238 
Penal branch 2,704 211 275 41 511 1 2 40 873 
Appellate courts 
total 17,331 574 2,643 1,094 3,324 1,205 90 947 6,503 
 
Table 4a – Citations to edited precedents – Appellate courts, figures 
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 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 2% 19% 7% 20% 7% 0% 8% 41% 
Business branch 5% 11% 10% 23% 13% 1% 1% 37% 
Labour branch na. na. na. na. na. na. na. na. 
Administrative 
branch  4% 10% 2% 3% 0% 2% 4% 20% 
Penal branch 8% 10% 2% 19% 0% 0% 1% 32% 
Appellate courts 
total 3% 15% 6% 19% 7% 1% 5% 38% 
 
Table 4b – Citations to edited precedents – Appellate courts, percentages 
 
1.3. County courts 
 
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 10,705 103 1,761 434 1,522 577 24 777 3,578 
Business branch 4,297 110 332 257 584 302 14 32 1,051 
Labour branch 1,588 31 346 188 474 4 4 63 903 
Administrative 
branch  7,934 110 1,644 181 275 11 207 276 2,220 
Penal branch 3,066 200 212 46 369 6 0 35 702 
County courts 
total 27,590 554 4,295 1,106 3,224 900 249 1,183 8,454 
 
Table 5a – Citations to edited precedents – County courts, figures 
 
 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1% 16% 4% 14% 5% 0% 7% 33% 
Business branch 3% 8% 6% 14% 7% 0% 1% 24% 
Labour branch 2% 22% 12% 30% 0% 0% 4% 57% 
Administrative 
branch  1% 21% 2% 3% 0% 3% 3% 28% 
Penal branch 7% 7% 2% 12% 0% 0% 1% 23% 
County courts 
total 2% 16% 4% 12% 3% 1% 4% 31% 
 
Table 5b – Citations to edited precedents – County courts, percentages 
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1.4. Local courts 
 
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1,396 7 171 61 198 46 6 30 411 
Business branch 314 2 26 9 27 13 0 1 55 
Labour branch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Administrative 
branch  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Penal branch 1,014 23 25 11 80 0 0 12 142 
Local courts total 2,724 32 222 81 305 59 6 43 608 
 
Table 6a – Citations to edited precedents – Local courts, figures 
 
 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1% 3% 4% 14% 3% 0% 2% 29% 
Business branch 1% 2% 3% 9% 4% 0% 0% 18% 
Labour branch na. na. na. na. na. na. na. na. 
Administrative 
branch  
na. na. na. na. na. na. na. na. 
Penal branch 2% 1% 1% 8% 0% 0% 1% 14% 
Local courts total 1% 2% 3% 11% 2% 0% 2% 22% 
 
Table 6b – Citations to edited precedents – Local courts, percentages 
 
1.5. Total  
 
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 26,881 326 4,370 1,449 4,727 1,440 88 1,734 9,868 
Business branch 9,026 314 812 728 1,565 799 42 75 2,685 
Labour branch 3,053 50 502 323 1,043 12 8 119 1,634 
Administrative 
branch  14,602 267 1,928 347 926 19 393 517 3,604 
Penal branch 7,950 564 600 142 1,251 9 4 114 2,202 
All courts total 61,512 1,521 8,212 2,989 9,512 2,279 535 2,559 19,993 
 
Table 7a – Citations to edited precedents – all courts, figures 
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 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1% 16% 5% 18% 5% 0% 6% 37% 
Business branch 3% 9% 8% 17% 9% 0% 1% 30% 
Labour branch 2% 16% 11% 34% 0% 0% 4% 54% 
Administrative 
branch  2% 13% 2% 6% 0% 3% 4% 25% 
Penal branch 7% 8% 2% 16% 0% 0% 1% 28% 
All courts total 2% 13% 5% 15% 4% 1% 4% 33% 
 
Table 7b – Citations to edited precedents – all courts, percentages 
 
1.6. Relative popularity of the precedent types 
 
We created one additional simple figure. We wanted to know the “impact factor” of the individual 
precedent types. For this, we simply divided the number of citations to different precedent types, by 
the total number of all (cited) documents available in databases. (Table 8 represent Table 7a totals 
divided by Table 2 totals).  
 
  
Number of 
decisions in 
total 
Number of 
documents 
citing the 
decision type Impact ratio 
Uniformity Decisions (UD)  169 1,521 9 
Abstract Opinions 1,162 8,212 7,1 
Principal Decisions of the Curia 2,441 2,989 1,2 
Court Decisions of the Curia (CD)  20,118 9,512 0,5 
Decision from Collection of Court Decisions Journal (CCD) 
– Journal of Appellate Courts (private collection) 2,722 2,279 0,8 
Decision from Administrative and Business Cases 
Collection (ABC) – private collection 5,636 535 0,1 
Constitutional Court Decisions 2,870 2,559 0,9% 
Total 35,118 27,607  
 
Table 8 – Impact of different precedent types 
 
1.7. Conclusions 
 
We can see, that one-third of the published 61,512 judgements contain a citation to previous cases. 
But this overall figure varies both by branch and court level.  
Regarding the court level, the Curia and county courts are on the average, while appellate courts are 
above this average and local courts fall below. The higher number of the appellate court is coming 
from citations to their own decisions published in their own journal, (CCD) published by a private 
publisher. They cite the decisions of the Curia more frequently than lower courts, or by the Curia 
itself. This surplus is also generated by all branches of the appellate courts. Inserting the documents 
of Curia into the decisions serves a tool of compliance with the upper courts.  
An analysis per branch shows an even greater dispersion of citation frequency. The labour branch 
tops the list with its 50% of frequency, followed by the other two civil branches. Penal law is the 
fourth in the list, while administrative law scores lowest. But if we examine the branches together 
with the court level, the picture is more mixed, because the number of citations fluctuates across the 
court levels. For example, the number of citations in the penal branch at Curia is quite high, even 
 15 
 
higher than found in civil law branches, and this surplus is comprised of all precedent types equally. 
Uniformity decisions, for example, are very popular authorities at Curia, and cited with significantly 
more frequency when compared with other branches.  
An obvious explanation could be that differences are caused mainly by the civil law–public law 
distinction. Rules are typically dispositive in civil law, and cogent in public law branches, and in penal 
law the nullum crimen sine lege principle further restricts the available interpretative and 
argumentative space of the judge. But the Curia’s citation activism in the penal field seems to 
contradict this assumption/idea. Another explanation could be that in penal law, the space for 
interpretation and the possibility to rely on precedents remains under the monopoly of the Curia, 
which is reinforcing its own practice.  
All tables (3-7) show the popularity of different precedent types as well. Court Decisions (CD) are the 
most popular case types referenced. We can find a citation to this type of precedents in 20% of all 
cases in average, and more than the half of all citations are CD citations. Here there is a sharp 
difference: upper courts (Curia, appellate courts) cite around 25% of CDs, while lower courts (the 
county and local courts) around 15% of CDs. But within the lower courts – especially the county 
courts – this lower percentage is counterbalanced by the more frequent reference to Abstract 
Opinions. Lower courts use AOs more frequently than individual precedent-types.  
It further deepens the picture, if we look at the relative importance (impact) of the precedent types. 
Here I used a very simple number: the impact is 1 if one decision is cited in one document. 
Uniformity decision’s impact number of 9 is not surprising: this is the only obligatory instrument. But 
Abstract Opinion’s high impact value (7.1 ) shows, that this a very widely used and popular document 
type.  What is surprising, is that privately published CCDs have the same high impact ratio, which is 
even higher than the CD’s impact ratio. The explanation is that courts more willingly cite fresher 
decisions. The nearly 10,000 CDs majority are overlooked.38
                                                          
38 I have a chart on the age of the cited precedents too. For reference, see the Hungarian version of this text: 
http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/mtalwp/2014_01_Zodi_Zsolt.pdf p. 42.  
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2. The change of citations of precedents in time 
2.1. Values 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
 Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing 
Curia  931 231 2,255 576 2,547 717 2,772 948 2,905 981 2,457 882 13,867 4,335 
Appellate Courts 1,477 452 2,918 963 3,021 1,069 3,435 1,275 3,776 1,435 2,704 1,153 17,331 6,347 
County Courts 4,955 1,366 5,648 1,613 6,031 1,822 5,809 2,024 4,169 1,495 978 399 27,590 8,719 
Local Courts 754 161 666 147 631 151 422 88 223 33 28 4 2,724 584 
Total 8,117 2,210 11,487 3,299 12,230 3,759 12,438 4,335 11,073 3,944 6,167 2,438 61,512 19,985 
 
Table 9 –Number of total judgments and citing documents between 2007 and 2012 
 
 
2.2. Percentages 
 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Curia  25% 26% 28% 34% 34% 36% 31% 
Appellate Courts 31% 33% 35% 37% 38% 43% 37% 
County Courts 28% 29% 30% 35% 36% 41% 32% 
Local Courts 21% 22% 24% 21% 15% 14% 21% 
Total 27% 29% 31% 35% 36% 40% 32% 
 
Table 10 – Changes of documents containing citations in percentage per court level  
 
 
 
 
Chart to table 9  
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2.3. Conclusions 
 
These tables show a clear picture. Apart from in local courts39, the number of citations used in 
Hungarian court decisions is increasing over time. The growth is minimum yearly 1%, but in some 
years 2-4%. The difference between the court levels stays stable. We have no data from the previous 
years, but I assume this was the picture before the start of the database.  
This growth has something to do with the change in attitudes of judges and parties towards the 
precedents, and I assume this is a self-reinforcing process. The availability of decisions, precedents, 
cases, and especially the increasingly effective search engines and publication methods40 are 
generating more and more citations to precedents. The parties want to win the case, and reasoning 
with previous cases is one tool for this. If a party cites a precedent, the counterparty should also 
argue with something, and the judges must somehow reflect on the citations. More published 
decision results more citations, and the habit of frequent citation involves a greater need for 
publishing more cases.  
However this, in itself, is not a decisive argument that Hungarian law is becoming a case law system. 
Rather, these, as all statistical figure should be interpreted together with the results of qualitative 
research, which shows a different picture.  
 
3. The impact of fields of law, and sub-fields of law to citations of precedents 
 
3.1. Some methodological remarks to the tables 
 
One of our hypotheses was that the field of law (case type) strongly influences the precedent 
intensity and that there is a great difference between case-types. The following tables present the 
number of citations to precedents per court department (business, civil, labour, administrative and 
penal) and by field of law (case type). We prepared statistics only for the most frequent case types.41 
Within one row, on the left side, there are 7 entries, namely the total number of judgments within 
the database, (2 column) and the number of precedent-citing documents within the field, (3 column) 
followed by the number of citing documents per precedent type (4-8 columns). The right part of the 
table shows some ratios, like the percentage of citing documents within the whole, (column 9 - 
column 3 divided by column 2) and the percentage of the citing documents per precedent type 
within citing documents. (Column 10-14 – columns 4-8 divided by column 3). All of the 5 tables are 
sorted by the ratio of citing documents (column 9).  
 
 
                                                          
39 The published judgments of the local courts are not representative, and especially not from years 2011 and 
2012. The reason is twofold: 1. The publication mechanism of the court website. The main rule is that the final 
judgments of the Curia and the Appellate Courts should be published, together with the connected first, (and in 
case of supervisory – cassation - decisions of the Curia, second) instance decisions. In case of normal appellate 
(final) decisions of the Appellate Courts, the first instance is the County Court. Therefore, from this pile there is 
no Local Court decision at all from the database. Local Court decisions can get into the database, if a second 
instance final County Court decision is attacked in a supervisory (cassation) procedure at Curia, and it is 
published as a background of the cassation decision of it, as the first instance decision. 2. Furthermore, as local 
decisions are the first decisions in time, and the average time of procedure is 1 -1,5 years, a cassation decision 
of the Curia published in 2012 is typically finishing a case started in 2010 at a local court. This is the reason why 
there are so few local court decisions from 2011 and 2012.  
40 In the most widely used legal databases the important case-types, (in some, all case types except CC), can be 
inserted into the text of the law, visually offering a connected case.  
41 Since the tables show only the most frequent case types, there is a difference in the ratio of citing 
documents, compared to tables 3-7. For example the civil branch’s ratio in the summary table (7) is 37, while in 
table 10 40%. The difference is coming from the less frequent case types.  
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3.2. Civil department 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Libel cases 958 788 10 2,327 17 136 576 82% 1% 295% 2% 17% 73% 
Termination of joint property 583 320 5 611 13 173 1 55% 2% 191% 4% 54% 0% 
Infringement of personal rights 2,588 1,377 10 1,310 289 1,051 1,686 53% 1% 95% 21% 76% 122% 
Invalidity of contract 1,724 761 229 458 276 1,032 25 44% 30% 60% 36% 136% 3% 
Determination of ownership 1,004 426 125 310 71 466 60 42% 29% 73% 17% 109% 14% 
Payment of contractual price 370 145 8 42 23 175 0 39% 6% 29% 16% 121% 0% 
Damage caused while exercising 
public powers 
542 171 9 84 48 179 34 32% 5% 49% 28% 105% 20% 
Damage compensation (Torts) 5,903 1,564 181 897 372 1253 385 26% 12% 57% 24% 80% 25% 
Repayment of loan 840 187 19 81 56 178 7 22% 10% 43% 30% 95% 4% 
Total 14,512 5,739 596 6,120 1,165 4,643 2,774 40% 10% 107% 20% 81% 48% 
 
Table 11 – Number of precedent types and ratios per case type at the civil department  
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3.2. Business department 
 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Invalidity of contract 436 217 94 160 90 228 16 50% 43% 74% 41% 105% 7% 
Determination of ownership 117 50 9 62 13 47 2 43% 18% 124% 26% 94% 4% 
Payment of contractual price 865 270 17 169 69 258 4 31% 6% 63% 26% 96% 1% 
Damage compensation (Torts) 1,241 335 87 143 155 334 13 27% 26% 43% 46% 100% 4% 
Unfair market practices 121 32 7 0 20 29 0 26% 22% 0% 63% 91% 0% 
Repayment of debt 526 132 41 51 24 156 1 25% 31% 39% 18% 118% 1% 
Payment of purchase price 401 95 28 37 21 95 0 24% 29% 39% 22% 100% 0% 
Invalidity of a shareholders’ 
meeting resolution 
194 38 12 10 12 43 2 20% 32% 26% 32% 113% 5% 
Total 3,901 1,169 295 632 404 1,190 38 30% 25% 54% 35% 102% 3% 
 
 
Table 12 – Number of precedent types and ratios per case type at the business department  
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3.3. Labour branch 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Unlawful termination with 
immediate effect 
542 210 5 70 69 312 10 39% 2% 33% 33% 149% 5% 
Damage compensation payment 258 95 3 80 14 104 21 37% 3% 84% 15% 109% 22% 
Unlawful termination of 
employment contract 
1,077 373 8 185 88 486 10 35% 2% 50% 24% 130% 3% 
Revision of Social Insurance 
Authority decisions 
257 60 4 21 18 49 0 23% 7% 35% 30% 82% 0% 
Total 2,134 738 20 356 189 951 41 35% 3% 48% 26% 129% 6% 
 
Table 13 – Number of precedent types and ratios per case type at the labour department  
 
3.4. Administrative branch 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Excise cases 181 72 0 37 7 66 0 40% 0% 51% 10% 92% 0% 
Tax cases 2,603 849 43 316 177 894 93 33% 5% 37% 21% 105% 11% 
Expropriation cases 566 163 4 201 6 13 24 29% 2% 123% 4% 8% 15% 
Public procurement cases 750 195 9 182 9 33 6 26% 5% 93% 5% 17% 3% 
Broadcasting cases 395 96 9 59 7 16 103 24% 9% 61% 7% 17% 107% 
Construction permission cases 565 91 24 36 12 53 18 16% 26% 40% 13% 58% 20% 
Land registry cases 419 67 11 52 10 24 20 16% 16% 78% 15% 36% 30% 
Refugee cases 1,022 145 0 145 0 1 0 14% 0% 100% 0% 1% 0% 
Total 6,501 1,678 100 1,028 228 1,100 264 26% 6% 61% 14% 66% 16% 
 
Table 14 – Number of precedent types and ratios per case type at the administrative department  
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3.5. Penal branch 
 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Defamation 193 72 1 3 9 88 99 37% 1% 4% 13% 122% 138% 
Theft 340 115 107 53 11 102 3 34% 93% 46% 10% 89% 3% 
Forgery of public deeds 211 71 85 24 9 62 7 34% 120% 34% 13% 87% 10% 
Forgery of private deeds 458 139 139 87 14 126 5 30% 100% 63% 10% 91% 4% 
Robbery 368 99 48 25 11 104 5 27% 48% 25% 11% 105% 5% 
Bribery 473 127 39 89 7 126 24 27% 31% 70% 6% 99% 19% 
Fraud 321 82 10 52 13 109 2 26% 12% 63% 16% 133% 2% 
Misappropriation 332 79 32 36 6 75 2 24% 41% 46% 8% 95% 3% 
Homicide 871 179 35 115 8 261 1 21% 20% 64% 4% 146% 1% 
Battery 1,575 299 57 136 11 476 8 19% 19% 45% 4% 159% 3% 
 Total 5,142 1,262 553 620 99 1,529 156 25% 44% 49% 8% 121% 12% 
 
Table 15 – Number of precedent-types, and ratios per case type at penal department  
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3.6. Conclusions 
 
Above, at II.1., I showed that the court level and department have an impact on the use of 
precedents. (Upper courts and private law branches are citing more frequently than any others.) 
Tables 11-15 add further information to this.  
The first visible phenomenon is that though the civil branches (civil, business, and labour) show a 
higher citation rate, their distribution is extreme: there are some case types, where the citation ratio 
is 90%, while there are some where it is around 20%. The dispersion rate in the public law branches is 
not so high, since the highest and the lowest rates in administrative court are 40% and 14%, 
respectively, and in the penal law branches, these figures are 37% and 19%, respectively.  
This means, that there are case types where practically every decision is citing a precedent.  
It is even more interesting to observe this together with the precedent types that the courts are 
citing. Since there is an obligatory document (the Uniformity Decision), which is officially more 
important than other types, one would think that this is the most frequent citation type, but that is 
not the case. In certain case types, there are no citations at all to UDs. This could be for a number of 
reasons.  
One is that the number of UDs is low and the “corpus” is casuistic: UD’s don’t exist in certain areas of 
law at all.  
Another reason becomes visible if we observe Constitutional Court decisions (CC column 14), in 
which there are extreme citation rates both in the positive and in the negative ranges. Here the 
cause is visible: all the case types in which constitutional court decisions are popular, have some (or a 
great) connection with the basic rights – e.g., libel cases, (73%) infringement of personal rights, 
(122%) the in civil branch, broadcasting cases in the administrative branch, (107%) and defamation in 
penal branch. (138%). 
A third reason is that if a certain precedent type is extremely popular, then the citation ratio of other 
types drops. It seems that the precedent types are interchangeable. This is a surprising fact, since 
these types are legally, and in their form, very different. As I indicated above, it is obligatory for 
courts to Uniformity Decisions (UDs). This is not the case with Abstract Opinions (AOs), but these are 
longer in text, and they comprise a broader legal topic (such as a legal act). Court Decisions (CDs) are, 
in format, very similar to Principal Decisions, and Uniformity Decisions, but their number is very high 
(as they decide one particular, narrow legal dilemma). But this all seems unimportant for everyday 
practice. The authority of a decision is independent from its intended “legal force” or from its place 
in the hierarchy of decisions. However, it seems that if there is an Abstract Opinion, courts prefer 
this: this is the situation in joint property cases (191%), libel cases (295%), personal rights 
infringement cases (95%)– these are all fields, where there is a “strong” Abstract Opinion. Where 
there is no AO, the practice uses CD and PD on the second place. Constitutional Court decisions are 
cited independently from the Supreme Court acts, in that field we do not see this correlation.  
In Chapter III, I will analyze the context of the citations, and other qualitative features, but it is 
important to note that Abstract Opinions are the kind of documents that are the closer in format and 
wording to the structure and logic of a traditional code. They are really law-like tools.  
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III. The qualitative research 
 
1. Methodology 
 
Though the number, structure and dispersion of the citations to precedents already can tell a lot 
about the use of precedents, the precedential character of a legal system cannot be analysed only by 
automatic, statistical tools. Therefore, I selected a random sample from the decisions of the Capital 
Appellate Court (Appellate level) and the Supreme Court (Curia).  
The sample contains 520 upper court cases (with the preceding case), which were broken down as 
follows:  
 
Year of case 
Capital 
Appellate 
Court Curia Total 
2007 19 29 48 
2008 36 61 97 
2009 34 81 115 
2010 38 49 87 
2011 38 78 116 
2012 32 25 57 
Total 197 323 520 
 
Table 16 – Cases observed in the qualitative research 
 
We then filled out an Excel spreadsheet, with the following data:  
1. The subject of the decision 
2. Citations  
3. History of the case (affirmed, dismissed, modified) 
4. The value of the case (if applicable)  
5. Treatment of the cited precedent (followed, distinguished, overruled) 
6. Treatment of citations of the lower court decision in appellate decision (ignore them, use 
them, or cite a new one.)  
7. Who cited first the decision? (court or parties, if available)    
 
The first two points are the same that were observed also in the quantitative research, and we only 
wanted to check the statistical data with manual tools. All other parameters can be explored only 
after reading the text of the judgments.  
 
2. Some remarks on the style of the decisions (demonstration, inference, justification, 
reasoning) 
 
The reason  for this is because one of the conclusions of the survey was that, in most of the cases, 
the precedents are cited very formally and mechanically. Sometimes even the text of the headnote is 
missing and only the number of the case is cited. (“The court took the CD No. …. into consideration”), 
but in most of the cases courts are only citing the headnote of the cases as if these were texts of a 
statute.  We have no exact data on this, but my estimation is that the great majority of the citations 
(more than 90%) either contain a headnote as a quotation, or parts of (sentences from) the headnote 
without explicit quotation, and less than 10% of the citations quote anything from the reasoning. As 
we will see later even if the case is distinguished, it is done with a stereotypical introductory formula. 
(“The court has not taken the Court Decision No. … into consideration, because its facts are different 
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from the recent case”). If the court analyses the reasoning, its reasoning is no longer than one 
paragraph, but rather typically a sentence.  
Moreover courts do not do two things. First, they do not see and use the precedents as a network of 
arguments. I have seen only one case (out of the 520) where a whole chain of arguments was 
developed in a case-law-like way. This case was one applying EU law, and analysed the jurisdiction of 
the General Court of EU. Further, courts do not reformulate the ratio decidendi of the case in order 
to adapt it to the case in hand, as, for example, English courts often do. The justification of an 
average Hungarian decisions seems like a logical operation, where the judgment (conclusion) is 
shown as a logical consequence of the facts, and the text of law.  
 
3. Results of the quantitative research 
 
3.1. Value of the case 
 
Value  
All 
judgements 
Number of 
citations42 % 
Small (under 1M HUF)  220 55 25% 
Medium (between 1 and 10 M HUF)  126 36 29% 
Big (more than 10M HUF) 71 22 31% 
Undetermined43  103 184 179% 
Total 520 297 57% 
 
Table 17 – The value of the case, and the citations 
 
One of our hypotheses was that the value of the case – the money at stake – has an effect on the 
reasoning effort employed by the parties and that this influences the number of citations.  This is not 
justifiable. Though the number of citations increases slightly as the value grows, this is not the 
decisive factor: the frequency of citations is determined mostly by the field of law or the case type in 
question.  
  
                                                          
42 Note that this figure is not the number of documents (like e.g. Table 3-7), but the ratio of citations, similar to 
Table 10-14s column 10-14.  
43 Most of the “undetermined value” cases are: criminal, administrative (where the subject of the case is the 
supervision of a decision of a state organ), or labour (where the illicit termination of the labour contract is in 
question), or infringement of personal rights. The latter two are very precedent-intensive – that is why the 
undetermined group has the highest citation ratio.  
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3.2. Distinguishing 
 
Number of decisions 520 
Contains citation 157 
Number of all citations 297 
Precedent followed 283 
Precedent distinguished  14 
 
Table 18 – Number of precedents distinguished 
 
It is not surprising, and it partly follows from the above mentioned facts, that 95% or precedents are 
cited in an affirmative, i.e. positive, context.  If the court is distinguishing the case, it does so in a very 
mechanical way, mostly using the same stereotypical phrases, like “the facts in case XXX are 
different; therefore, the reasoning/holding/precedent should not be applied in this case”. We have 
not found any cases, where there was an explicit overruling.  
3.3. Treatment of citations by the lower court 
 
Number of decisions 520 
Contains citation 157 
Number of all citations by the upper court 297 
Number of all citations by the lower court 104 
Citations mentioned in a positive context by the upper court 51 
“Agreement ratio” in precedents 49% 
Number affirmed cases 377 
Affirmation ratio 73% 
 
Table 19 – Treatment of citations of the lower courts in the context of the history of the case 
 
As was stated before, lower courts are citing fewer precedents than upper courts. In our sample, we 
found 297 citations in 520 judgments vs. 104 citations by the lower courts. The surprising result of 
the table is that typically the upper courts do not cite the same precedents as lower courts. Of the 
297 citations made by the upper courts, only 51 were also used/cited by the lower courts. Or, to put 
it another way, only the half of the citations used/made by the lower courts are also cited by the 
upper courts at appeal; another 246 totally different citations are inserted on the second (third) 
instance. Thus, typically the story is that if the lower court uses two citations, one is ignored, the 
second retained, and two more are newly inserted. This number is even more surprising if we 
compare it with the affirmation ratio of the upper courts, which is 73% overall.  
 
3.4. By whom is the precedent cited and brought into the argumentation?  
 
At lower courts   
By the court 83 80% 
By the parties  21 20% 
Total 104 100% 
At upper courts     
By the lower court, and the 
upper court agrees 
51 17% 
By the upper court 190 64% 
Parties 56 19% 
Total 297 100% 
 
Table 20 - By whom the precedent was brought into the reasoning 
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An important question for us was who had introduced the citation into the procedure. Who initiated 
the use of a precedent? Unfortunately, [we] did not find a clear answer for this. In most of the cases 
there is no sign of the source. In other cases the court indicates that this was proposed by the party ( 
“Defendant cited the CD No ……,”) or was used by the lower court (“The first instance court cited 
properly CD No….”).  For this particular question, to get a better picture, the text of the petitions 
should have been studied too.  
 
4. Final conclusions 
 
First, I have to state that everything which is written above is primarily applicable for the Hungarian 
judicial system. However, I believe it has wider relevance to all civilian legal systems. Here, I will only 
repeat those statements, which could have a general significance.  
Precedents seem to be an important part of the legal reasoning of the Hungarian courts, and the 
number of citations to precedents is significantly increasing over time. (From 27% to 40%, between 
2007 and 2012; on average 33%)44 If trends continue, within a few years more than half of all 
decisions will contain a precedent citation.  
Upper courts and private law branches cite more frequently than other courts, but the basic 
determining factor of precedent frequency is the case type. In certain case types, practically all 
decisions contain a citation to a precedent.  
Though there are in length, topic and even in binding force different precedent types, the everyday 
judicial practice of courts treats them as interchangeable. If there is a binding Uniformity Decision, 
the courts – especially on lower levels - will use that, but if there is no such precedent, it will cite 
applicable Abstract Opinions, Court Decisions from the official collection, or even those cases 
published in the private collections.   
Though there is no stare decisis in the Hungarian/civil law system, if the particular case, or case type  
requires, courts do use the precedents without binding force. Therefore, from this point of view, 
stare decisis is not a decisive factor when courts are citing a precedent. The other side of this coin is 
that courts do not have to reflect on the proposals of the parties – they can simply ignore them.  
The ratio – dicta distinction exists in a very strange form. Courts almost exclusively cite the official 
headnotes of the decisions, and it is very rare that they cite anything else. One can say that this 
headnote is the ratio of the precedent. But since the wording of the headnote is very similar to the 
wording of an amendment in a statute, these texts are cited exactly like law texts. Judicial reasoning 
– reflecting the long-standing tradition of civil law systems – is not a rhetorical effort, but shows itself 
as a logical process.  
There is neither distinguishing, nor any other sophisticated approach to a case used, as we can see in 
section III.3.2. Rather, the approach of courts to cases is binary. If the case cited by the party does 
not fit to the “inference” of the court, the court simply ignores it, and will not waste time of 
distingushing. If it fits, the court will cite it like an amendment of a law. The overwhelming popularity 
of Abstract Decisions, which are regulating a particular field of law, and their statute-like wording 
illustrates this tendency.  
Consequently, there is no such tenet that the “spirit of the rule counts and not the wording”. 
Hungarian law is textual, text-based, and text bound. The importance of precedents is growing 
quantitatively, and if this is a sign of convergence to case law, then there is a type of convergence. 
But the textual tradition of the civilian law is very strong, and the sophisticated ways of handling 
precedent and reasoning found in common law systems are simply not present in Hungarian law. In 
other words it is not that the legal system, as a whole, evolving to be more precedential in 
nature/character. Rather, more precedents are being published and are used increasingly widely 
within all branches of law. 
                                                          
44 see II.2.2. 
